| Introductory Essays xx
tension. Seizing the opportunity, the sailors
of the Potemkin arrived on land with an
honor guard carrying Vakulenchuk’s body
and laid it on the steps of the harbor with a
note pinned to the body highlighting the he-
roic actions taken by Vakulenchuk. The note
also made certain to mention that the sailors
had taken the proper recourse against the
captain and officers of the Potemkin.
Vakulenchuk’s body quickly became a
shrine for the strikers and revolutionaries
in Odessa. When Cossacks and policemen
attempted to break up the growing congrega-
tion of people around the body of Vakulen-
chuk, a signal was given onshore for the
Potemkin to fire. The police and the Cos-
sacks quickly retreated, and the ship did not
fire into the city. However, the sailors on
board the Potemkin made it known through
official communications that any attempt to
use violence to disperse the crowd would
lead to the Potemkin firing into the city.
In the midst of these tense negotiations,
government officials had already called for
Tsar Nicholas II to impose martial law as a
means to regain control of the city. Nicholas
agreed and sent a telegram telling officials to
“take the most decisive measures to suppress
the uprising.” After receiving the tsar’s or-
der, the troops, the policemen, and the Cos-
sacks used gunfire as a means to subdue the
protests. After a night of suppression the
government forces had killed approximately
2,000 people and wounded an additional
3,000. The harsh means used by the tsar’s
forces had the intended effect and quelled
the rebellion in Odessa.
Having lost the momentum of the upris-
ing, the Potemkin and its revolutionary crew
sailed to Constanza in Romania in an at-
tempt to replenish much-needed supplies.
The Romanian officials offered a deal to the
crew of the Potemkin that essentially called
for the peaceful surrender of the vessel. The
crew of the Potemkin refused the offer and
attempted to steam toward Feodosiia to gain
coal, water, and other much-needed sup-
plies. The landing party charged with acquir-
ing supplies for the Potemkin were quickly
rebuffed by government gunfire. In a hope-
less situation, the crew of the Potemkin
sailed back to Constanza, took the original
offer, and surrendered the ship.
Though the mutiny and seizure of the bat-
tleship Potemkin did not threaten the stability
of the tsar’s regime, it did demonstrate that
the tension that led to the marches on Bloody
Sunday had not disappeared in the face of the
tsar’s minor political adjustments.
The October Manifesto
In the aftermath of the uprisings in Odessa
and the seizure of the Potemkin by “revolu-
tionaries,” Tsar Nicholas II in August 1905
attempted to make an additional concession
by issuing an imperial decree for an elected
Duma with consultative powers. Even
though the tsar moved to allow for the elec-
tion of Duma representation, he still held
fast on limiting the political powers granted
to the assembly. His action did nothing to
appease the restless demands of the people.
Nicholas’s offering in August provoked a
massive general strike that lasted for three
months and did nothing to calm the ire of the
people.
Faced by this mounting tension and op-
position, the tsar capitulated and on October
30, 1905, issued the October Manifesto. The
essence of this important document is that
the tsar announced the creation of an elected
Duma with real legislative functions, which
transformed the Romanov government into
a constitutional monarchy. The vast majority
of people affiliated with political parties
hailed this change as an important and his-
toric step in the history of Russia, which it
was indeed. However, more radical factions
