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terrorists. In addition, intelligence analysis isn’t anticipatory enough to advise commanders how to outthink the enemy, seize the initiative, and use it for not just one, but a multitude of advantages—e.g., freedom of maneu- ver, position, decision, knowledge, tempo, momentum, and technology. Fur- thermore, intelligence analysts are not involved enough in collection—intelligence analysts need to develop very specific observables and direct collection efforts. Intelligence analysts must be involved with ana- lytic condition-setting such as thinking about and designing knowledge, sen- sor, and data architectures to support the inputs and outputs of advanced analysis. In addition, the analyst must learn to engage in a thought process that is analytic wargaming to learn how to compete with adversaries for the initiative. Intelligence analysts are not sufficiently trained and educated in diverse subjects like anticipation, culture, semiotics, and technology (in a city) to be of maximum value in outwitting a capable enemy and under- standing the culture in which they operate. Unfortunately, intelligence ana- lysts do not receive sufficient training in some needed aspects of intelligence analysis to be effective, such as how to decompose and recompose, how to engage in and use tendency, aggregation, and anomaly analysis, how to think about and employ finer points of thought and more sophistication in link, pattern, and trend analysis, and finally how to engage in synthesis. These shortfalls in analytic training, education, and operations are not the fault of the courageous and talented people who perform analytic work today. It is, sadly enough, the defense institution’s fault, as it has not yet engaged in the hard thinking work to first understand what is needed to support intelligence operations in urban settings, and then to set about to change intelligence analysis to produce thinking sufficient to go after insur- gent, irregular warrior, and terrorist threats in large urban settings no matter where the city might be located. Each of these subjects will be discussed in depth throughout the book. Intelligence analysis to support urban operations against irregular adversaries and counterinsurgency operations must broaden in scope, sig- nificantly change the specificity of its focus, provide the cognitive capabili- ties for intellectually aggressive analysts to use, be underpinned by a philosophy, and employ a new system of thought. As such, it will include fourteen essential cognitive elements of advanced analysis, use five types of observables to guide collection, recompose and synthesize data to make sense of it, and aggressively and passionately engage the enemy in a war of wits to continuously win this struggle. Further, advanced analysis will be fungible in three respects: First, its thought processes and “how to think” philosophy are appropriate for the full spectrum of future conflict. Second, it provides “a way” to think that transcends locations or regional pecu- liarities. Advanced analysis can bore into immense detail at one location while Introduction 3