Introduction 7 “kidnapped, enslaved, tortured, and brutally raped,”49 and if they survived, they ­ were simply forgotten. Although Prime Minister Abe Shinzō expressed his sympathies and apologized for the situation ­these ­women ­were in, a for- mal apology that acknowledged Japan’s responsibility is still lacking.50 The prime minister even denied the coercion by the Japa­nese military in 2007. In his claims, as Hayashi Hirofumi remarked, he “was supported by more than a few politicians, and his opinion may be viewed as a reflection of the nation- alistic atmosphere of Japa­nese society.”51 In fact, Abe leads a faction in Japa­ nese politics that is interested in reversing the research done so far for the sake of reestablishing Japan’s honor, which is why members of the group around the prime minister claim that “the Nanjing Massacre was fabricated, that comfort ­women ­were regular prostitutes rather than victims of war crimes, and that Japan did not act aggressively”52 during the Second World War. Neo-­nationalists like Katō Norihiro argue that the “distortions” that exist within Japan’s postwar society make a sincere apology impossible.53 He claimed that significant prob­lems have been left out of the discussion in post- war Japan, especially the Japa­nese war dead. In addition to such revisionist arguments, ­those Japa­nese who ­ were born ­ after 1945 have to decide “what kind of opinions they should have about the war­time atrocities Japa­nese com- mitted against other Asians.”54 To achieve such a decision, the research results related to Japa­nese war crimes would have to be broadly communicated within Japan’s society, an approach that is regularly sabotaged by revisionist interest groups, and Japa­nese scholars who are truly interested in shedding light on the cruelties of the past are sometimes better known outside Japan than in their home country. The situation is also complicated by the fact that the victim narrative is affected by existing nationalism in countries where survivors tend to be po­liti­cally instrumentalized.55 When the prosecution of Nazi crimes took place, the prosecutors ­were accused of being ­either too ­eager or too slack the penalties ­were ­either too harsh or too soft.56 Although the ­trials reflect a certain “good ­will,”57 this sentiment seems to be lacking in Japan, where a war crime trial was never initiated without pressure from a foreign power. Moreover, the general population detests identifying with the perpetrators, so closely examining the past might cause ­people incon­ve­nience and lead unpleasant questions about one’s individual or familial roles during ­to those dark times.58 Regarding such atrocities and war crimes, witnesses cannot adopt a neutral approach lest their accounts lose power as with the Japa­nese, if ­ there are no documents to back up their reports, witnesses them- selves ­will be accused as liars.59 Herein lies another prob­lem: many of the perpetrators remain anonymous and ­will prob­ably never be brought to jus- tice. It thus seems more impor­tant to understand how it became pos­si­ble for “ordinary men” to be so violent against ­women forced into sex slavery, POWs, and civilians.
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