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Introduction Towards the end of March the German G.H.Q. arrived at the firm conviction that it would not be possible for the enemies in the West to force a decision in a measureable time, even if further portions of the formations in process of reconstruction on the Western front had to be used in the East to annihilate the offensive power of the Russians for all time. —Erich von Falkenhayn1 One of the greatest misconceptions of intellectuals, especially those of a Marx- ist orientation, is that history proceeds in particular direction toward a prede- termined outcome. This notion, based on the regarding of history as a linear phenomenon, is both appealing and deceptive. The appeal of such an approach is that it helps the historian explain the course of rather complicated events. At the same time, however, such an approach serves to oversimplify. This is especially true when it comes to military history. It is far too easy, for example, to draw a direct line from Gettysburg to Robert E. Lee’s surrender at Appo- mattox, although some recent scholarship has challenged that notion.2 If there is one human activity that is nonlinear in nature, it is war. Indeed, this is one of the central themes of Carl von Clausewitz’s classic analytic work, On War. Certainly, one conflict that was most nonlinear in its conduct was the First World War. Embarked upon by the major European powers for reasons that ranged from coping with an existential threat (Austria-Hungary), to demonstrating ethnic solidarity (Russia), to an almost paranoid fear about encirclement (Germany), the participants had only the haziest notions as to what they wanted the world to look like after victory had been secured. All of the major powers entered the war with plans that called for a quick victory.3 By the end of 1914, all of the plans had miscarried. Thus as 1915 dawned, all of the belligerents were now faced with the prospect of fighting and winning a prolonged and bloody war. The year