xxi Introduction |
were, from west to east, the U.S. 4th Infantry
Division (Utah), the U.S. 1st Infantry and
29th Infantry Divisions (Omaha), the British
50th Infantry Division (Gold), the Canadian
3rd Infantry Division (Juno), and the British
3rd Infantry Division (Sword).
Operation
overlord
proved to be a vast
undertaking. The airborne forces alone would
require 1,340 C-47 transports and 2,500 glid-
ers. Ten thousand aircraft would secure the
skies. Naval support for the invasion would
come from 138 bombardment warships, 221
destroyers and other convoy escorts, 287
minesweepers, 495 light craft, and 441 auxil-
iaries. In addition, there were some 4,000
landing ships and other craft of various sizes.
Eisenhower faced a difficult decision,
given terrible weather in the days preceding
the planned landing. Informed by his chief
meteorologist that a break in the weather
might occur, Eisenhower decided to pro-
ceed. This decision worked to the Allies’ ad-
vantage, for the Germans did not expect a
landing in such poor weather. The French
Resistance was informed by radio code, and
the airborne forces took off.
The airborne operation involving 23,400
U.S. and British parachutist and glider troops
occurred on schedule on the night of June
5–6, but thick cloud banks over Normandy
caused pilots to veer off course to avoid mid-
air collisions. German antiaircraft fire,
jumpy flight crews, and Pathfinders who
were immediately engaged in firefights on
the ground and unable to set up their beacons
led to premature drops and to paratroopers
being scattered all over the peninsula. Some
were even dropped into the English Chan-
nel, where they drowned, dragged down by
their heavy equipment. Gliders crashed into
obstacles, and they and the paratroopers
came down in fields that had been deliber-
ately flooded by the Germans as a defensive
measure. Much equipment was thus lost.
Nonetheless, the wide scattering of forces
caused confusion among the defenders as to
the precise Allied plans. Officers collected
as many men as they could, and improvised
units were soon moving on the objectives,
most of which were secured.
Success was likely if the Allies could es-
tablish a bridgehead large enough to allow
them to build up their strength and overcome
the German defenders. Once the Allies broke
out they would have the whole of France for
maneuver, because their armies were fully
mechanized and the bulk of the defending
German forces were not. The only possibil-
ity of German success was for the defenders
to rapidly commit panzer reserves, but this
step was fatally delayed by two factors.
The first was Allied naval gunfire support
and air superiority of 30 to 1 over Normandy
itself (there were large numbers of ground-
support aircraft, especially the U.S. Repub-
lic P-47 Thunderbolt and North American
P-51 Mustang and the British Hawker Ty-
phoon). The second was Hitler’s failure to
immediately authorize commitment of the
armored reserves. Hitler was convinced that
the invasion at Normandy was merely a feint
and that the main thrust would come in the
Pas de Calais sector. Allied deception mea-
sures played a key role in deluding him.
The British “double-cross” system worked
to perfection. Every German agent in Britain
was either dead, jailed, or working for British
intelligence. The British actually controlled
the entire German spy network in the United
Kingdom and used it to feed disinformation
to the Germans. Operations
fortitude northTH
and
fortitude south
also deceived Hitler.
Op er ation
fortitude northTH
caused him to be-
lieve that the Allies intended to invade Nor-
way from Scotland, leading him to maintain
and even reinforce substantial German units
there;
fortitude south
led Hitler to believe
that the main Allied effort in France would be
