xxii | Introduction
a subsequent landing in the Pas de Calais
area, the narrowest point of the English
Channel, and that the lodgment in Normandy
was only a feint.
To this end the Allies created the “First
U.S. Army Group” under Lieutenant General
George S. Patton, still without command fol-
lowing an incident in which he had slapped
two soldiers suffering from combat fatigue in
Sicily. The Germans expected that the ag-
gressive Patton would command any Allied
invasion of the continent. The First U.S.
Army Group, an imaginary formation of 18
divisions and 4 corps headquarters, contrib-
uted nothing to
overlord
but did confuse the
Germans.
Not until late July did Hitler authorize the
movement of the Fifteenth Panzer Army
from the Pas de Calais to Normandy. In ef-
fect, the deception totally immobilized 19
German divisions east of the Seine. Al-
though units of the Fifteenth Army were
moved west to Normandy before that date,
this was done piecemeal, and hence they
were much easier for the Allies to defeat.
Meanwhile, the actual Normandy invasion
began. In the days before the invasion, some
2,700 vessels manned by 195,000 men were
on the move. Operation
neptune
transported
by ship 130,000 troops, 2,000 tanks, 12,000
other vehicles, and 10,000 tons of supplies.
At about 5:30 a.m. on June 6, 1944, the bom-
bardment ships opened up against the 50-
mile invasion front, engaging the German
shore batteries. The first U.S. assault troops
landed 30 to 40 minutes later, and the British
landing craft were ashore two hours later.
The landing was in jeopardy only on
Omaha Beach, where because of rough seas
only 5 of 32 amphibious duplex-drive tanks
reached the shore. Support artillery was also
lost when DUKW amphibious trucks were
swamped by the waves. Some landing craft
were hit and destroyed, and those troops of
the 1st Infantry Division who gained the
beach were soon pinned down by withering
German fire. U.S. First Army commander
Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley even
considered withdrawal.
At 9:50 a.m., the gunfire support ships
opened up against the German shore batter-
ies. Destroyers repeatedly risked running
aground to provide close-in gunnery to assist
the troops ashore; indeed, several destroyers
actually scraped bottom. It was nearly noon
before the German defenders began to give
way. The 1st Infantry and 29th Divisions
overcame German opposition with sheer de-
termination, reinforced by the knowledge
that there was no place to retreat.
The landings on the other beaches were
not as difficult. Overall, for the first day the
Allies sustained some 10,300 casual-
ties—4,300 British and Canadian and 6,000
U.S. A recent study suggests that a night
landing would have produced fewer casual-
ties. The Allies had used night landings with
great success in the Mediterranean, but
Montgomery believed that overwhelming
Allied air and naval power would make a
daytime landing preferable. Still, the losses
were comparatively light.
The Allies put ashore 75,215 British and
Canadian troops and 57,500 U.S. forces on
D-Day and 1 million men within a month.
Unfortunately for the Allies, during June 19–
20 a force 6–7 storm blew out of the north-
west and severely damaged Mulberry A in
the American sector. The storm also sank
well over 100 small craft and drove many
more ashore, bringing to a halt the discharge
of supplies. Vital ammunition stocks had to
be flown in. Mulberry A was abandoned, but
a strengthened Mulberry B provided supplies
to both armies until the end of the war.
Eventually the United States committed
60 divisions to the battle for the continent.
The British and Canadians never had more
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