4 Se­niors and Squalor To what extent are we willing to allow parentalist13 stances by our government into our lives? Should reason, and our fealty to it, blind us to the ­ human position of “unreason”? Should we stoke the tendency to address “undesirables” through judicial and legislative exercise, even when no criminal activity is suggested? As ­these questions suggest, this strange phenomenon ­under consideration is more complicated than it might appear to be at first glance. ­ Those who have actually faced this situation most as­suredly already know that, even if they only got as far as the relative simplicity of untangling the law to see what might be done about it. A brief discussion of each of ­ these questions follows, which serves as an overall introduction to this proj­ect. To What Extent Are We Willing to Allow Parentalist Stances by Our Government into Our Lives? If we agree that government intervention into our lives should be mini- mized, then forcing “help” onto someone who does not want it might be repug- nant to our values. On the other hand, if we believe that government should have the authority to intrude into our decisions even when we do not wish it so—­thereby taking something like a paternalistic role14—­then we might like to try to figure out when intrusion is appropriate and how far it should go.15 For example, a person friendly to the notion of government intrusion into a seemingly private decision might agree that the state has a legitimate interest in prohibiting automobile ­ drivers from text­ing while driving,16 but that same person may or may not agree that the state has a legitimate interest in choos- ing each person’s ­ career path,17 mandating that each eligible voter cast a vote,18 requiring that each person have health insurance,19 or enacting legislation for compulsory retirement savings.20 Or, more directly to the point, an advocate of parentalist-­type policies would perhaps argue that the government should compel the occupant of a filthy residence to do a number of ­ things, such as cleaning it up or removing herself entirely, depending on the degree to which the person had ­ adopted a soft-­paternalist or a hard-­paternalist stance, or some- thing in between. Competing ideas about the appropriate role and legitimacy of government intrusion or involvement appear as a constant in the complex social equation presented by the opening scenario. Ceding personal decision-­making author- ity to government—­even if one can rationalize its involvement as legitimate exercise of power—is no small act. It is essentially a del­e­ga­tion of personal sovereignty to an institution. If personal decision-­making authority is not given voluntarily, should state exercise of power to take decision-­making
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