Fidel Castro’s Road to Power, 1952–1959 5
1895. When the sinking of the Maine in Havana harbor generated support
for intervention, U.S. troops entered the fray in 1898 and easily defeated
the Spanish, assuring the victory of the in­de­pen­dence forces.
Cubans quickly learned the truth of what many had feared: in­de­pen­
dence from Spain did not mean an in­de­pen­dent Cuban nation. Although
pledged to granting Cuba in­de­pen­dence, the United States, entering a phase
of expansionism in the Ca­rib­bean, could not resist conditioning the with-
drawal of its troops on Cuba’s adoption of a constitutional provision mak-
ing the island a protectorate. The Platt Amendment denied Cuba the essence
of nationhood—­sovereignty—by granting the U.S. government “the right
to intervene for the preservation of Cuban in­de­pen­dence [and] the main-
tenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and
individual liberty.”2 The United States also acquired a perpetual lease over
Guantánamo, which it initially used as a coaling station for its navy. ­These
and other restrictions written into the 1901 Cuban constitution and con-
firmed in the 1903 U.S.-­Cuban Treaty of Relations ­ were ­ bitter pills for ­ those
patriots who had fought two wars for genuine in­de­pen­dence. A result of
American tutelage during the three-­plus de­cades of the “Platt Amendment
Republic,” wrote Cuban intellectual Jorge Mañach, was “general civic indo-
lence, a tepid indifference to national dangers.”3
The United States exercised its right of military intervention by reoccu-
pying the island between 1906 and 1909 and landing troops in 1912 and
1917. Equally debilitating to the development of an in­de­pen­dent Cuba ­ were
the many instances of overt po­liti­cal intervention supported by the implicit
or explicit threat of military action. General Enoch Crowder usurped most
of the powers of President Alfredo Zayas (1921–1925), choosing his cabinet
and ordering fiscal reforms that left U.S. banks in a dominant position.
Perhaps the most significant po­liti­cal intervention was that of 1933, when
ambassador-­at-­large Sumner Welles refused diplomatic recognition to the
reform-­oriented government of Ramón Grau San Martín, which followed
the overthrow of long-­term dictator Gerardo Machado. Facing U.S. opposi-
tion, the fledgling government was unable to consolidate its power and was
quickly replaced by the more conservative and subservient military regime
of Fulgencio Batista. Many Cubans look back to 1933 as a critical turning
point—­ a lost opportunity to address Cuba’s mounting economic, social,
and po­liti­cal prob­lems while moderate solutions ­were still pos­ si ­ ble.
U.S. control over Cuba changed complexion, but not substance, ­after
1934 when President Franklin D. Roo­se­velt, in keeping with his Good
Neighbor Policy ­toward Latin Amer­i­ca, agreed to a new treaty that abro-
gated the Platt Amendment. The United States honored its renunciation
of military intervention, but, as before, U.S. economic and geopo­liti­cal
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