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2 Terrorist Criminal Enterprises Another challenge in facing this transformation is competitive govern- ment bureaucracies. Most jealously guard their monopolies on thwarting terrorism and tend to endorse particularistic and outmoded definitions for defining it. Yet, rather than continuing to treat terrorists solely as zeal- ots, such groups should be understood for their engagement in complex illicit commerce. Their uneven evolutionary trajectory and ideologically motivated violence should not obscure the fact that they act as terrorist criminal enterprises. Indeed, their criminal operations are now as diverse as the multiplicity of groups and include, among others, drug trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, extortion, robbery, kidnapping for ran- som, theft and sale of antiquities, illegal mining, and smuggling of com- modities. The adaptation to a more profit-seeking mind-set has ultimately made combating terrorist criminal enterprises more complex, but it also may provide new opportunities for policy makers. This book explores a number of terrorist groups that have transformed into terrorist criminal enterprises or which are in the process of doing so. Each case study was authored by a notable expert or experts, providing an incisive assessment of the nature of these groups and their ideology, operations, and, above all, criminal interests. One aim of the book is to discern each group’s distinctive criminal modus operandi. It also seeks to document the nature and extent of their profitable illicit activities. Each chapter then explores how groups are connected to government entities, possibly via official corruption and collusion. Finally, the book offers pol- icy options to address the threat posed by these groups that increasingly combine their malevolent terrorist ideals with criminal greed. TERRORISTS NEED MONEY TOO Most terrorist groups were initially propelled into the shadow econ- omy by the counterterrorism measures undertaken by the states in which they were based, by the international community as it sought to interdict state-sponsored terrorist financing (particularly after September 11), or a combination of both. Whether by accident or design, one of the easier methods to augment the shortfall presented itself in the form of illicit commerce where terrorists could employ the same criminal tactics gener- ally considered the domain of organized crime groups. Indeed, although each of these groups can certainly be termed terrorist in that their ide- ological goals remain to politically control people through acts of out- rageous violence, their illicit transactions are the purview of organized crime. What may distinguish them from traditional organized crime is their motivation for raising the illicit funds and the manner in which the money is spent. Yet, the influx of criminal cash and the appeal of immoderate crimi- nal lifestyles corrupted some of the principles of terrorist organizations. The moral distortion led orthodox insurgents to mutate into transnational