Print

An Introduction to Terrorist Criminal Enterprises 3 criminal enterprises whose motivations are not always evident or ideo- logically pure. What may continue to conceal this criminal trajectory is the fact that most groups have not lost their commitment to fanaticism. De- spite their newfound wealth, they continue to make zealous pronounce- ments reinforced by violence. The criminal money now assists them in perpetrating audacious attacks and allows them to extend their aspira- tions internationally. ENDING THE STOVEPIPES Articulating the combined ideological goals and criminal activities of terrorist criminal enterprises will be necessary for governments to pro- ceed with effective counterterrorism strategies. At present, policy contin- ues to be made reactively, guided by largely outmoded and stovepiped conceptualizations that treat terrorism and organized crime as distinct en- tities. Moreover, with a few notable exceptions, academic and policy lit- erature often provides imprecise definitions, concentrating on the “nexus” between these nonstate actors rather than identifying the fact that most terrorist groups’ transformation to terrorist criminal enterprises is a fait ac- compli. 2 Although at one time there was significant evidence of a “nexus” with organized crime, or a terrorist-criminal continuum, such symbioses may have been largely transcended altogether. 3 Hence, breaking the false dichotomy that defines these groups as separate phenomena will provide a fresh perspective and have widespread policy implications for the man- ner in which states deter and dismantle terrorist groups. THE EVOLUTION TO TERRORIST CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES A number of groups lurched gradually into organized crime, while others launched into it rapidly, apparently viewing the benefits of illicit commerce as an opportunity to advance their ideologies, acquire new weapons, and grow their organizations. Despite overarching ideological motivations, the vast sums of illicit funds and the descent into criminal activity appealed to the avarice of both lower echelon operatives and their leaders. Nor once established was there any indication they would relinquish their newly acquired skills and high profits. Thus, over time, various terrorist groups became increasingly proficient at organized crime, in part by recruiting people with criminal capabilities to their number. Globalization also assisted in this endeavor. Many of the rapid developments in commerce, finances, telecommunications, and technol- ogy enabled them to exploit the sinister underbelly of increased global trade and engage more widely in smuggling, credit card fraud, trade-based money laundering, and even cybercrimes. 4 These opportunities were