Since 9/11, there has been a vast outpouring of research and scholarship on terrorist organizations. Al-Qaida, Da’esh, and many, many terrorist groups have received detailed scrutiny. The U.S. government, among oth- ers, has been generous in funding work on terrorist groups’ origins, inter- nal organization, and plans and operations. The academic and policy world also produce significant work on trans- national criminal organizations. Originally, much of the focus was on drug cartels and narcotics trafficking. The scope of work has expanded over time. There is superb work today on criminal organizations engaged in human trafficking, weapons trafficking, credit card fraud and cyber- crime, and many other forms of illegal revenue generation. Where the academic and policy communities need to devote more at- tention and effort is on the link between terrorist and criminal activity. The world of terrorism analysis has long focused—understandably—on preventing terrorist acts. Criminal activity by these same organizations traditionally has been viewed as incidental and, at most, instrumental on behalf of terrorist goals. The world of criminal enterprise analysis, on the other hand, has tradi- tionally taken the view that crime organizations want to run operations and maximize profit. They want to stay away from activities that bring unwanted attention from governments and law enforcement. In other words, criminal enterprises want to bribe government officials, not over- throw governments. This edited collection, Terrorist Criminal Enterprises , makes a wel- come and significant contribution because it addresses both worlds. It Foreword
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