xvi Introduction On July 28, the Third Balkan War began when Austria-Hungary formally declared war on Serbia later that day, it commenced shelling Belgrade. On July 29, Russia ordered actual mobilization in four Russian military districts. Tsar Nicholas II made the decision only with great difficulty and after an exchange of telegrams with Kaiser Wilhelm. On July 30, Russia ordered a general mobiliza- tion. This ensured that the Balkan war would become a general European conflict as military timetables came into play. In planning for the possibility of a two-front war against France and Russia, General of Cavalry Alfred von Schlieffen, chief of the German General Staff dur- ing 1891–1906, envisioned sending most of the German military strength against France with a holding action against a slow mobilizing Russia. Following the rapid defeat of France, Germany would then deal with Russia. Implicit in this is that Germany could not allow the Russians to mobilize and still win the war. The ­German government, therefore, demanded that Russia halt its mobilization. With no answer forthcoming, on August 1, Germany ordered its own general mobilization and declared war on Russia, turning the Third Balkan War into World War I. The French cabinet had refused to mobilize the army but it did order troops to take up position on the frontier, although far enough from it so as to convince Brit- ish public opinion that France was not initiating hostilities. The Schlieffen Plan, however, mandated there be no delay in opening an attack against France. Thus, on August 1, the Germans demanded to know how France would respond to war between Germany and Russia. Berlin insisted that even if France pledged neutral- ity it would have to surrender certain eastern fortresses as proof of “sincerity.” No French government could agree to this, and Premier René Viviani replied that France would act in accordance with its interests. That same day France ordered military mobilization. On August 3, Germany declared war on France. COURSE OF THE WAR Four of the five great European powers were now at war. Britain held back. As early as July 31, London had demanded assurances from both Paris and Berlin to respect Belgian neutrality, guaranteed by the major powers since 1839. France replied affirmatively, but German declined. Again, the Schlieffen Plan drove Ger- man policy. Schlieffen had regarded the heavily fortified frontier of eastern France, where the French Army would undoubtedly mass, as a formidable obstacle. The quickest way to defeat France was to invade from the northeast through Belgium. On August 2, German troops occupied Luxembourg. The same day, Berlin demanded the right of transit through Belgium. Brussels rejected this on August 3, and early the next morning German troops invaded. This brought Britain into the war on August 4. Italy declared that the Triple Alliance did not obligate it to fight an aggressive war and remained neutral. Within a few weeks, however, the Otto- man Empire joined the Central Powers and Japan sided with the Allies. For the Allies, the most potent weapon was the British Navy. Britain also had the world’s largest merchant marine, vital for securing and transporting war materials. With 19 million tons of shipping, it accounted for half the world’s total.
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