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ONE Individualism versus Individuality THE POLITICAL “MARKET” AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY In theory, ­ there are vari­ous ways by which the public in a demo­cratic repub- lic might exercise its authority to influence the policy-­making decisions and actions of elected officials.1 One version holds that governmental insti- tutions and pro­cesses can and should be arranged so that the policies gov- ernment officials adopt maximize the satisfaction of ­people’s private wants or preferences. This is the so-­called market model of democracy developed by Joseph Schumpeter2 and subsequently elaborated formally by Anthony Downs3 and by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock.4 The market model rejects what Schumpeter called the “the classical model” of democracy, in which the purpose of government is to act as the instrument of the ­ people as a ­ whole in effecting the popu­lar (or general) ­ will. In contrast, the market model dismisses as conceptually confused the notion that a society can form and articulate a desire or an intention. It views society as an aggregate of individuals, each of whom has his or her own desires and priorities. ­Because satisfying individual desires is what eco- nomic markets attempt to do, the market model of democracy suggests that elections can be viewed as a quasi-­market mechanism for the same purpose. As in a market economy, in a market democracy participants can be thought of as consisting of consumers and producers. The latter compete for the ­favor of voters by promoting their “brand” (e.g., Republican or Demo­ crat) and its “product” (the party platform, candidate promises, ­ etc.). They