Introduction xiv
Fledgling dictators in interwar Europe, however, viewed the propaganda of
World War in a very different light. The perceived success of British propaganda
provided the defeated Germans with a fertile source of counter-propaganda
aimed at the postwar peace treaties and the ignominy of the Weimar Republic
that followed the toppling of the Kaiser. Writing in Mein Kampf, Adolf Hit-
ler devoted two chapters to propaganda. By maintaining that the German
army had not been defeated in battle but had been forced to submit because
of disintegration of morale from within German society, accelerated by skill-
ful British propaganda, Hitler—like other right-wing politicians and military
groups—was providing historical legitimacy for the “stab-in-the-back” theory.
Regardless of the actual role played by British (or Soviet) propaganda in helping
to bring Germany to its knees, it was generally accepted that Britain’s wartime
experiment was the ideal blueprint on which other governments might subse-
quently model their own propaganda apparatus. Convinced of propaganda’s
essential role in any political movement set on obtaining power, Hitler saw it as
a vehicle of political salesmanship in a mass market.
The task of propaganda, Hitler argued, was to bring certain subjects to
the attention of the masses. Propaganda should be simple, concentrating on
a few essentials, which then had to be repeated many times, with empha-
sis on such emotional elements as love and hatred. Through the sustained
uniformity of its application, propaganda, Hitler concluded, would lead to
results “that are almost beyond our understanding.” The Nazis did not make
a distinction in their terminology between agitation and propaganda, unlike
the Bolsheviks. In Soviet Russia, agitation was concerned with influencing
the masses through ideas and slogans, while propaganda served to spread the
ideology of Marxist-Leninism. The distinction dates back to Marxist theorist
Georgi Plekhanov’s famous definition, written in 1892: “A  propagandist pres-
ents many ideas to one or a few persons; an agitator presents only one or a
few ideas, but presents them to a whole mass of people.” The Nazis, on the
other hand, did not regard propaganda as merely an instrument for reaching
the party elite, but rather as a means for the persuasion and indoctrination of
all Germans.
World War  II
The legacy of World War was very important because it would largely deter-
mine how the belligerents viewed propaganda at the outbreak of hostilities in
1939. Thus, for all the negative connotations that have been attached to it,
most governments were alert to the desirability in “total war” of utilizing pro-
paganda to present their case to public both at home and abroad. In modern
warfare, propaganda is required to (1) mobilize hatred against the enemy; (2)
convince the population of the justness of one’s own cause; (3) enlist the active
support and cooperation of neutral countries; and (4) strengthen the support
of one’s allies. Having sought to pin war guilt on the enemy, the next step is to
make the enemy appear savage, barbaric, and inhumane.
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