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Origins of Intervention 11 international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accor- dance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter. . . . we are prepared to take collec- tive action . . . including Chapter VII . . . should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations. There is room in the negotiated text to allow disagreement as well as consensus on the question of who may legitimately authorize inter- vention. The French and the Germans brought this to fever pitch dur- ing the 2003 Iraq War debate. As chapter 7 shows, some French officials went so far as to say that a Security Council resolution was both a legal and a moral necessity. American and British leaders maintained the traditional view that this right is reserved to sovereign states. In a way, dispute between those who see the prerogatives of U.S. political military dominance as a force for good, and those who fear the “hyper-power” and would balance or contain it. The latter would rule out U.S. unilateralism, while putting the Global Sheriff at the ser- vice of the international community.4 It is telling that the man who championed R2P after the failed interventions of the 1990s, former secretary-general Kofi Annan, rejected his progeny in the wake of the Iraq War. His successor, Ban Ki-moon, refers to the principle in highly moralized, almost religious terms: Preventing mass atrocities is among the international community’s, and the United Nations’, most sacred callings. Regrettably, it is a duty we have not always acquitted well. The killing fields of Rwanda, Cambodia and the Balkans stand silent witness to the brutality that passed unchecked by an international system lacking both the will and the vision to act. I believe that we can, and we must, do better. . . . That is why, from my very first day in office, I have made Darfur my highest priority.5 Opposition is widespread and eclectic. At a recent briefing at UN headquarters, the lines were clearly drawn, with the Sudanese ambas- sador front and center to denounce any claim that Darfur might be ripe for asserting the principle. Egypt had just led a failed campaign in the General Assembly fifth committee to get rid of the special as- sistant’s job all together. At the Security Council, China and Russia remain skeptical of anything that may bring interference in their do- mestic affairs. At the General Assembly, the president of the 64th session, Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann from Nicaragua, convened a special meeting in the otherwise sleepy summer of 2009 to consolidate opposition to the concept preceding the General Debate on R2P. Some called it a “sneak attack.”6 During the debate, d’Escoto couched his opposition as a