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6 Ace in the Hole refueling was developed for the B-29 and its improved version the B-50, the U.S. counted on use of British bases. Not until the Triad concept of long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) came to fruition in the early 1960s could the U.S. clearly calculate that nuclear systems at forward bases were not critical for general war with the Soviets. Fully cognizant of the strategic importance of their little island, British leaders applied leverage to reinstate the veto or at least a strong right of consultation on American nuclear systems based in Britain. London's deeply rooted fear that the next world war would mean the destruction of western civilization clashed repeatedly with Washington's deep-seated desire to cast off all restraint and settle matters once and for all with the Kremlin. Even without a veto over use of atomic bombs, the British helped restrain American leaders from unleashing Armageddon upon the Red Hordes and in the backwash annihilate much of Europe and Asia. However, Allied resistance to U.S. calls for an anti-Communist crusade created increasing friction and frustration which tended over time to push Washington toward unilateral action.11