Print

4 Indoctrination to Hate sexual minority groups for centuries (Bell, personal communication, ­ September 13, 2001). The psychological sequelae of 9/11 were felt proximally and distally from ground zero in Manhattan. Persons living close to the 9/11 site in New York evidenced symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). While those closest to ground zero revealed the highest levels of PTSD six months after the attack, a substantial number not situated nearby also met the criteria for PTSD (Galea et al., 2003). Among those with the highest levels of exposure and highest probable PTSD, the proportion was as high as 66% (Bonanno et al., 2006). Farach et al. (2008) reported another aspect of the impact of the 9/11 cataclysm in their study of premorbid cases of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) for individuals subsequently exposed to the 9/11 attacks. They reported that GAD was associated with greater social and work disability, loss of psychosocial resources, anxiety and mood symptoms, and worry assessed one year after the attack. In their review of the consequences of the 9/11 cataclysm on mental health consumers, Franz et al. (2009) noted that the terrorist attacks had a well-documented psychological effect, irre- spective of whether or not individuals were proximally nearby the target sites. The Deadly Other: Middle Easterners as Terrorists Another form of psychological injury was, of course, the impact of the attack on American principles of inclusion—as reflected in the rise after 9/11 in anti-Muslim attitudes and hate violence. With the 9/11 attack, the popu- lace experienced the first foreign combatant that had struck the country since Japan bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941—the most significant cultural cataclysm for the United States in the twentieth century. Importantly, too, in 1941 the United States was galvanized against a standing government in Japan. With the 9/11 attack, hostility was directed not at a political entity but at a cultural and religious population that spanned the globe and did not reflect a singular geographic location or political ideology. After 9/11, there was both an initial increase of anti-Islamic attitudes after 9/11 and enduring hostile attitudes after the terror attacks in Western coun- tries (Sheridan, 2006). The anti-Muslim rhetoric, frequently tied to 9/11, has become part of the talking points of the second cataclysm, the 2016 presi- dential election of Donald Trump. As Kahn (2017) comments, “Islamophobia has become a campaign tool used to galvanize voters.” During their presiden- tial campaigns, now-President Trump famously said, “I think Islam hates us” while the future secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Ben ­ Carson, said, “Muslims shouldn’t be allowed to become president ” and U.S. senator Ted Cruz talked about patrolling Muslim neighborhoods. The creation of a “deadly other”—a signal of a cultural cataclysm—was one of the first consequences of 9/11. The heightened anxiety of Muslims as