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xvi INTRODUCTION any significant changes to the longstanding and accepted rules of war or, indeed, the art of war, when there is less human engagement and more robotic engagement that may be controlled more and more by artificial intelligence? Matthew Symonds (2018) argues that in order to comply with the rules of armed conflict, especially from a Western perspective, humans must be included somewhere in the process. Symonds goes on to argue that some countries (perhaps those that do not have the same military views as Western countries) may be more inclined to use autono- mous robotic systems in order to gain a military advantage against another nation (Symonds 2018). The primary concern may center on the idea of an autonomous system. If a robotic system is truly autonomous, then does that necessarily mean that there is no human action included in a war-fighting effort? Many may have the view that drones (air, sea, and ground pilotless vehicles) are all controlled by an operator sitting at a console, perhaps thousands of miles away. But what happens if humans are not even involved as a console operator? The “who” is now gone, so we are now searching for the “what.” What is operating the weapon delivery system on the one hand that will exact the loss of human life on the other hand? Symonds (2018) points out that artificial intelligence and deep learning, perhaps deeply embedded within the framework of a robotic system, will affect the way wars and conflicts are carried out in the not-too-distant future. The choice for engagement may be determined solely and unilaterally by the robotic system itself, without human involvement (Symonds 2018). As researchers and military think- ers explore war and conflict a generation or two into the future, we may find that technology will be more consequential than that of human involvement indeed, we may already be there. National Security During the Cold War, defining national security was rather straightforward, espe- cially as it pertained to the United States and its key allies, particularly those mem- ber nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has had no other comparable global counterpart for which to prepare for militarily, as it did in the case of the Soviet Union. As the only current global superpower, since 1989, allies and adversaries alike have been watching U.S. behavioral characteristics to see how America leads in a unipolar world. Unlike the Cold War, where many countries aligned themselves with either the West or the Soviet Bloc, there is no longer a clear taking-of-sides proposition. The world is a different place, and it may be an even more dangerous place. In 1991, Alan Tonelson, a research fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council Educational Foundation, a research organization based in Washington, DC, study- ing U.S. economic, national security, and technology policy, advised that the United States could no longer afford an internationalist approach where everything is of national security interest to the United States. Tonelson argued that America needs to consider its own self-interests and to not bear the costs or the risks as it had throughout the Cold War era. Instead, Tonelson suggested that the United States