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xxii Introduction Qatar became so Brotherhood focused that in 2013, Andrew Hammond, former Reuters bureau chief in Saudi Arabia, called the country “a mini Ikhwanistan.” But the chickens came home to roost when, in the summer of 2017, Saudi Arabia and three allies—Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt—announced an embargo against Qatar that would not end until thirteen demands were met, many of which involved Qatar breaking ties with the MB. As of the publishing of this book the standoff shows no signs of abating, and King Salman even recently told French president Emmanuel Macron that a Saudi military invasion is being considered. Why would the Saudis go to such lengths to sway the politics of a tiny neighboring nation? Because they, like this book, view Qatar’s actions as indicative of a general conspiracy to overthrow various Arab govern- ments in order to transplant an international MB-inspired Islamist leader- ship. In short, the Saudis see the Qataris as the primary financial backer of the most dangerous political organization in the region that has, again and again, made it very clear that it wishes a widespread revolution by any means necessary. This view was particularly confirmed after the so-called Arab Spring and Qatar’s extensive support of the uprisings. The tiny nation’s engage- ment with the MB suddenly grew into a region-wide issue that the Saudis felt needed to be addressed. Lines were drawn, allies assembled, and a campaign to alert the world to the fact that the MB is an international ter- rorist organization on par with ISIS and Al-Qaeda began, leading to the Saudi-led boycott of Qatar in 2017. As the renewed focus on Qatar has now shown the global community, Qatari MB support has gone beyond its hosting of MB leader, Qaradawi, its billions sent to various Middle Eastern MB affiliates (especially its propping up of Hamas and the Morsi regime), and its hosting of the Al Jazeera network as a regional mouthpiece for MB’s racist, violent ideol- ogy. Qatari efforts now reach beyond the Middle East, into Europe, Asia, and the United States. Qatari activity in these areas is largely the story of maintaining financial sources that fund MB activities in the MENA region. The Qatari royal family funded Qaradawi’s globe hopping in the early years by paying for his recruiting adventures in Pakistan, Malaysia, In- donesia, Europe, North America, and even as far afield as Japan and South Korea. In recent years Qatar has given more than $175 million to Brotherhood-linked groups in France, the UK, Italy, and Denmark. It has also heavily funded the Geneva-based Alkarama Foundation run by Abdulrahman Al-Nuaimi under the guise of a charitable foundation sup- porting Muslim causes. However, the United States and the UK have both designated Alkarama as a terrorist organization due to its support for Al- Qaeda and the MB. In addition, Qatar is now using Turkey as a proxy for its MB efforts and growing closer to Iran. As far as Qatar and Turkey, the struggling