Preface
In its 2002 landmark decision in Atkins v. ­ Virginia, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that the execution of ­people with intellectual dis-
ability was a “cruel and unusual punishment” barred by the Eighth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. In ­ doing so, the Court, implicitly
and at times explic­itly in its opinion, recognized the lesser culpability of
this vulnerable population. While the Atkins Court gave states some lati-
tude to develop appropriate mechanisms for assessing intellectual disabil-
ity in capital cases and thus implementing the new constitutional exclusion
against capital punishment for ­ people determined to have intellectual dis-
ability, some jurisdictions have mistakenly interpreted Atkins as allowing
them to deviate, in some instances markedly, from the generally recognized
national professional consensus regarding the determination of intellec-
tual disability. At bottom, intellectual disability remains a clinical diagno-
sis, and the states and their courts must recognize and apply existing
nationally accepted clinical definitions to guide their decisions in deter-
mining ­ whether the individual in any Atkins’ hearing has intellectual dis-
ability. This was reiterated in the most recent Supreme Court rulings in
Hall v. Florida (2014) and Moore v. Texas (2017).
Determining ­ whether a par­tic­ u ­ lar capital defendant or death row inmate
has intellectual disability in many death penalty cases has been far from
a ­simple clinical exercise. This is so for a number of reasons, including
(1) re­sis­tance to the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins itself; (2) the use
of scientifically unsound definitions of intellectual disability and assess-
ment methods for its determination; (3) judge, juror, and attorney ste­reo­
types of ­ people who have an intellectual disability; (4) the use of “expert”
witnesses who lack familiarity with and clinical judgment in intellectual
disability; and (5) racial and ethnic bias. Despite being informed by more
than a de­cade and a half of experience since the Court’s decision in Atkins,
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