Introduction xi Next, we examine China’s plan to become a leading space power by 2045. China’s space road map envisions the development of techniques for asteroid mining, the creation of nuclear-powered shuttles for space explo- ration, and the industrialization of the Moon to fabricate satellites that can harness energy in space. Gaining an understanding of China’s vision will allow the United States to effectively compete in the space domain. We then focus on the challenges to U.S. space security. Hostile nations are increasingly treating space as a war-fighting domain and pursuing strategic military activities that challenge American space security. We discuss natural threats, anti-satellite weapons, and kinetic and nonkinetic threats, as well as outline the contemporary and future threats from China, Russia, and lesser spacefaring adversaries. After outlining the challenges, we consider whether American space primacy is in decline. Failing to understand and identify the technological drivers of the coming space economy, coupled with the increasing adver- sarial competition in the space domain, could be perilous. We detail the myriad reasons to expand the U.S. presence in space and provide histori- cal analogues that further encourage space development. The new strategic challenges posed by space have made it necessary to alter both military organization and doctrine. By guaranteeing the secu- rity of American space assets, the U.S. government can further incentivize commercial investment in space. This requires the United States to have a robust security presence in that domain, as well as a clear understanding of authorities and priorities for the new Space Force and Space Command and how both can complement the other U.S. military services. Here we will delve into the origins of America’s newest military branch, as well as its future. In addition to protecting military assets with hard power, soft power methods are also necessary to advance U.S. interests in space. Today, global norms in space (on issues such as the weaponization of space) remain fluid and largely unformed. Here we discuss space norms and partnerships. We explain why, as the United States positions itself as a space leader, it should foster relationships with allied nations and increase the pace of progress toward common objectives and standards in the space domain. Next, we chart the dimensions of U.S.-China competition as viewed through the lens of the six centers of gravity in space power competition (space policy and finance tools, space information services, space trans- portation and logistics, human presence in space, power for space sys- tems, and space manufacturing and resource extraction). Several points of elaboration will prove beneficial for policymakers, including (a) how to prioritize space activities across the six space sectors, especially given the finite limits on available resources (b) understanding the degree to which the United States benefits economically or strategically from specific efforts within each space sector and (c) understanding how the United States
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